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INTRODUCTION
On January 25, 1991, the Minneapolis City Council approved an
ordinance providing for domestic partnership registration., In so
doing, Minneapolis joined a growing number of municipalities which
grant domestic partnership status 2 in lieu of marriage to nontradi-
tional couples, including same-sex couples.
1. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CIVIL RIGHTS ORDINANCE ch. 142.10-.70 (1991). See
Letter to the Editor of Timothy Rose, Media Advocate, Gay and Lesbian Community
Action Council, Minneapolis, Minnesota printed in L.A. Times, Mar. 4, 1991, at B4,
col. 3 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt file).
2. Domestic partnership ordinances have been adopted in at least two dozen
cities across the United States, including Los Angeles, Berkeley, West Hollywood,
and Laguna Beach, California, New York City (by executive order of the mayor) and
Ithaca, New York, Seattle, Washington, Madison, Wisconsin, and Tacoma Park,
Maryland. Longcope, Gay Couples Fight for Spousal Rights, Boston Globe, Mar. 4, 1991,
at 38 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt file) [hereinafter Longcope, Spousal Rights].
In October 1989, Denmark legalized same-sex unions in what it terms "regis-
tered partnerships." DANISH REGISTERED PARTNERSHIP ACT No. 372 (1989). See also
Six Gay Couples Join in "Partnerships" as Danish Law Takes Effect, Minneapolis Star Trib-
une, Oct. 2, 1989, at 4A, col.L
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A myriad of benefits are bestowed by the state on legally married
couples. These benefits include parenting and custody rights, health
care for partners and dependents, bereavement leave, tax benefits,
inheritance and property rights, pensions and social security. Do-
mestic partnership registration does not give registered partners the
legal benefits of marriage.3 However, domestic partner registration
provides public recognition of important private relationships4 and a
mechanism through which the private sector can extend benefits.5
Interestingly, municipalities have taken the lead in the recognition
of same-sex relationships, an issue ignored by the states and denied
by the courts. In Minnesota, same-sex marriages were prohibited in
3. The Minneapolis ordinance includes two resolutions: one supporting sick
and bereavement leave for city employees; the other supporting a mayoral task force
exploring diversity in Minneapolis families. Letter to the Editor of Timothy Rose,
Media Advocate, Gay and Lesbian Community Action Council, Minneapolis, Minne-
sota printed in L.A. Times, Mar. 4, 1991, at B4, col. 3 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt
file).
Ordinances in other cities, such as those in Berkeley, West Hollywood and
Laguna Beach, California, Seattle, Washington, Ithaca, New York, Madison, Wiscon-
sin, and Tacoma Park, Maryland, extend full benefits and medical insurance to city
employees. Longcope, Spousal Rights, supra note 2, at 38.
Denmark's law grants same-sex couples all but a few of the rights and responsi-
bilities enjoyed by married heterosexuals. Homosexual families will not be recog-
nized by the state Lutheran Church and they will not be allowed to adopt children. It
was feared that allowing adoption "could stop Third World countries [from] making
adoptive children available to Danish families." Isherwood, Denmark Legalizes Homo-
sexual Marriages, Proprietary to the United Press International, May 26, 1989 (LEXIS,
Nexis library, Currnt file). The new law "provides that registered partners will auto-
matically inherit from each other, have the duty to support each other, be taxed as
married couples and have the same access to social services as if they were married."
Id. Official divorce proceedings will be required for dissolution. Id.
4. See, e.g., Paper Includes Gay Couples on What Was Wedding Page, N.Y. Times, Mar.
22, 1991, at A20, col. 3 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt file). The Minneapolis Star
Tribune announced its policy to include announcements of domestic partnerships on
what had been its wedding and engagement page. The name of the page was
changed from "Weddings" to "Celebrations." The spokeswoman for the newspaper,
Bette Fenton, stated that the change was a " 'natural response' to a new Minneapolis
city ordinance allowing domestic partners to register their relationships with the
city." Id.
5. A Bronx hospital, Montefiore Medical Center, for instance, now provides
health benefits to homosexual employees and their partners if they can show that
their living arrangements are similar to those of married couples. Bronx Hospital Gives
Gay Couples Spouse Benefits, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1991, at 1, col. 2 (LEXIS, Nexis li-
brary, Currnt file). Consumer United Insurance Company of Washington, licensed
to do business in all but five states, provides a plan in which domestic partners may
be named on policies. Firemen's Insurance Company of Washington has recently
announced a plan that extends home ownership and renters' coverage to domestic
partners of policyholders. Longcope, Spousal Rights, supra note 2, at 38. Official re-
gistration of domestic partnerships would encourage these private developments.
[Vol. 17
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SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
1971 by the Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Baker v. Nelson.6
Dismissed by the United States Supreme Court for lack of federal
question, Baker stands today as a leading decision in this area and has
been relied on by several jurisdictions in ruling against same-sex
marriages. 7
This Note acknowledges the failure of the courts to extend consti-
tutional protections to a traditionally invisible and historically under-
represented group-homosexual individuals-who have been
denied the option of marriage, an institution protected by the Con-
stitution as a fundamental right for heterosexual couples. This Note
discusses the history, the purpose of, and the benefits that flow from
marriage. The Note then examines the various constitutional theo-
ries that courts may use in examining legislation that adversely af-
fects homosexuals.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF MARRIAGE
Family law as we know it, including marriage, developed from
English canon and common law.8 The Anglo-Saxon form of mar-
riage came into being during the feudal period.9
The formal marriage ceremony developed during the eighteenth
century. Through passage of Lord Hardwicke's Act,o the English
Parliament required a church ceremony, publication of banns and a
license to achieve valid marital status."I The Act's aim was the aboli-
tion of "Fleet" marriages that were being performed by imprisoned
clergy in Fleet Prison and which were considered a public scandal.12
In early America, marriage was regulated by civil authorities, and
informal or common law marriages were recognized.'1 During the
early pioneer period, it was often difficult to locate a civil officer or
clergy member to perform a formal marriage ceremony. Marriage
6. 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (197 1), appealdismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)
(Appeal dismissed for lack of federal question.).
7. See Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1122-25 (C.D. Cal. 1980), cert.
denied, 458 U.S. I I I (1982) (Male Australian citizen and male American's marriage
ceremony declared invalid for immigration purposes); Burkett v. Zablocki, 54 F.R.D.
626 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (dismissing action by two females seeking order compelling
county clerk to issue application for marriage license); Singer v. Hara, 52 P.2d 1187,
1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (affirming denial of marriage license to two males);
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (finding two females not
entitled to a marriage license).
8. R. OLIPHANT, MINNESOTA FAMILY LAW PRIMER 65 (1988) (discussing history
of and current law concerning marriage in Minnesota).
9. Id.
10. Lord Hardwicke's Act, 27 Geo. 2, ch. 33 (1753).
11. R. OLIPHANT, supra note 8, at 68.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 65.
1991]
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licenses were difficult to obtain due to the distance between settle-
ments and the difficulties of travel. As a result, common law mar-
riage became widely recognized. 14
Early American family law was influenced by church doctrine.
Nineteenth and twentieth century United States Supreme Court de-
cisions exhibit a strong Christian influence concerning marriage and
divorce. 15
Today, marriage is regulated by individual state statutes.' 6 Despite
the absence of express prohibitions, state legislators apparently ex-
pressed their intent to prohibit same-sex marriages by using words
of heterosexual implication, such as "husband and wife" and "bride
and groom."' 17 For instance, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Baker
v. Nelson,' 8 concluded that, in the absence of an express prohibition
of same-sex marriages, "[iut is unrealistic to think that the original
draftsmen of our marriage statutes, which date from territorial days,
would have used the term [marriage] in any different sense [than be-
tween heterosexual couples]."19
II. THE PURPOSE OF MARRIAGE
The controversy over same-sex marriages revolves around the
14. See 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 45 (1970). Today, common law marriages are
generally not recognized. Id. at § 46. Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 405 N.W.2d
303 (1987); Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594 (Wyo. 1981); Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410
N.E.2d 1325 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204
(1979).
15. See generally Riga, The Supreme Court's View of Marriage and the Family: Tradition or
Transition?, 18J. FAM. L. 301 (1980) (discussing the Supreme Court's philosophy con-
cerning marriage and family).
16. See generally MINN. STAT. ch. 517 (1990). The Minnesota statute, in defining
marriage as a civil contract, provides:
Marriage, so far as its validity in law is concerned, is a civil contract between
a man and a woman, to which the consent of the parties, capable in law of
contracting, is essential. Lawful marriage may be contracted only when a
license has been obtained as provided by law and when the marriage is con-
tracted in the presence of two witnesses and solemnized by one authorized,
or whom one or both of the parties in good faith believe to be authorized, so
to do. Marriages subsequent to April 26, 1941, not so contracted, shall be
null and void.
Id. § 517.01.
17. Sullivan, Same Sex Marriage and the Constitution, 6 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 275, 277
n.19 (1973) [hereinafter Sullivan, Same Sex Marriage].
18. 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (197 1), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
Baker involved the marriage application of two males. A district court clerk refused to
issue the license because the applicants were of the same sex. On appeal, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court determined that chapter 517 of the Minnesota Statutes does not
authorize same-sex marriages. The court further held that chapter 517 does not of-
fend the first, eighth, ninth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution.
19. Id. at 311, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
[Vol. 17
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many private and public purposes of a marital relationship. "The
policy favoring marriage is 'rooted in the necessity of providing an
institutional basis for defining the fundamental relational rights and
responsibilities of persons in organized society.' "20 Embodied
within the marital relationship "is a voluntary public commitment of
two people to accept certain socially imposed obligations toward
each other .... Yet, above all else, the bond of the relationship is
the mutual love and respect each of the partners has for the other." 2 1
Thus, the marriage relationship promotes individual values22 as well
as community values. 23
The public benefit of marriage is important to same-sex couples
seeking social acceptance of their relationships. In addition, public
expression of commitment through marriage triggers state recogni-
tion and state protections. 24 State recognition and protection pro-
motes "a sense of belonging to the community through mutual
public identification."25 The long list of entitlements and legal pro-
tections granted to married couples attest to the value society places
on marriage. 26 However, prohibition of same-sex marriages pre-
20. Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267,275, 758 P.2d 582,587, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254,
259 (1988) (quoting Laws v. Griep, 332 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Iowa 1983)).
21. Note, Fundamental Interests and the Question of Same-Sex Marriage, 15 TULSA L.J.
141, 152 (1979).
22. Buchanan, Same-Sex Marriage: The Linchpin Issue, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 541,
542 n.8 (1985) [hereinafter Buchanan, Linchpin]. The author asserts that marriage
promotes many individual values, five of which are:
(1) generosity or the spirit of sacrificial giving; (2) fidelity or the honoring of
commitments; (3) integrity or the creation of trust; (4) self-respect or the
assurance of personal worth; (5) sustained joy.
Id.
23. See Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy--Bal-
ancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 472-91 (1983). Commu-
nity values are promoted because "it is primarily through family bonds that both
children and parents learn the attitudes and skills that sustain an open society." Id. at
472.
24. See Ingram, A Constitutional Critique of Restrictions on the Right to Marry-Why
Can't Fred Marry George--or Mary and Alice at the Same Time, 10J. CONTEMP. L. 33, 35-37
(1984) [hereinafter Ingram, Critique] (listing ten legal and economic benefits available
to married persons).
25. Lewis, From This Day Forward: A Feminine Moral Discourse on Homosexual Mar-
riage, 97 YALE L.J. 1783, 1798 (1983) [hereinafter Lewis, Moral Discourse]. But see
Friedman, The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: Constitutional Require-
ments and Evolving Notions of Family, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 134, 143 n.58 (1987-88)
[hereinafter Friedman, Necessity for State Recognition] (citing D. ALTMAN, THE
HOMOSEXUALIZATION OF AMERICA, THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE HOMOSEXUAL 185-
90 (1982) (Because marriage is unavailable to same-sex couples, these couples are
able to develop less oppressive and more adaptable relationships.)).
26. See Friedman, Necessity for State Recognition, supra note 25, at 155. Professor
Friedman provides a list of government protections for married couples.
1991]
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cludes same-sex couples from enjoying the personal and legal bene-
fits afforded heterosexual couples through marriage.
Somewhat antiquated ideas and values are frequently advanced as
the purpose of marriage and are sometimes used as ajustification for
allowing only heterosexual marriages. The encouragement of pro-
creation is one such justification.27
In 1942, the United States Supreme Court, in Skinner v.
Oklahoma,28 noted that the state has a basic interest in encouraging
reproduction because "procreation [is] fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race." 29 However, in light of evolving
attitudes toward marriage in our society, courts are unlikely to fash-
ion constitutional protections regarding the institution of marriage
based solely on the encouragement of and ability to procreate.SO
States do not require heterosexual couples to prove their capacity
or willingness to procreate before granting them a marriage license.
Because childless same-sex couples are "similarly situated" as child-
less heterosexual couples, states cannot logically deny same-sex
couples marriage licenses based on an inability to procreate.3'
Encouragement and promotion of the traditional family unit has
been advanced as a reason for denying same-sex couples the right to
marry.3 2 The family unit provides each partner with companionship,
27. Sullivan, Same Sex Marriage, supra note 17, at 280.
28. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
29. Id. at 541.
30. Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriages, 82 YALE LJ. 573, 579 (1973) [here-
inafter Note, Legality].
31. Sullivan, Same Sex Marriage, supra note 17, at 280. (The equal protection
clause requires that persons "similarly situated" with respect to a statutory purpose
be treated alike.). Id. at 278.
Furthermore, new reproductive technology is making family planning for same-
sex couples possible and many same-sex couples are choosing to raise children. See
generally Shapiro & Schultz, Single-Sex Families: The Impact of Birth Innovations upon
Traditional Family Notions, 24 J. FAM. L. 271 (1985). See also Friedman, Necessity for State
Recognition, supra note 25, at 159 (discussing private contracting for donor insemina-
tion and surrogate parenting); Comment, Second Parent Adoption for Lesbian-Parented
Families: Legal Recognition of the Other Mother, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 729, 729-34 (1986)
(discussing second parent adoption of lesbian couples having children through do-
nor insemination).
32. Sullivan, Same Sex Marriage, supra note 17, at 282. The family unit has tradi-
tionally been associated with a heterosexual couple. Id. However, today there is no
"typical" American family. Many families now consist of nontraditional arrange-
ments, including single parent families formed due to divorce and single mother-
hood, stepfamilies, grandparents-grandchild units, senior citizen group homes,
pseudo-parent-child and homosexual family units. Note, Family, Marriage, and the
Same-Sex Couple, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 681, 684 (1990). Today's families are diverse
indeed, but do have a common thread, love and care: "[Flamilies should, realistically,
be defined by the economic and psychological functions they serve, not by the forms
they take." Id. at 685. -
[Vol. 17
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emotional and psychological support and basic health care. The
state, in turn provides benefits which reward family stability and
childrearing.33
In fact, many same-sex couples can and do raise children. Same-
sex couples can provide the necessary shelter and care as well as cre-
ate a satisfactory psychological environment.34 Nevertheless, same-
sex unions are denied the economic advantages and privileges of
marriage which heterosexuals raising children enjoy.3 5
Ironically, the state's interest in promoting family stability is actu-
ally undermined by depriving same-sex couples of marital rights.
Forbidding marriage discourages formal commitment to a lasting,
stable relationship.36 Allowing same-sex marriages would, arguably,
promote the same social goals strived for in heterosexual
marriages.3 7
One argument given for forbidding same-sex relationships is "mo-
rality." This argument, however, "presents the thorny question of
the legitimacy of state enforcement . ."38 Does the state have the
right to encourage "moral" behavior among its citizens?S9 Some
scholars believe a common morality is as necessary to society's con-
tinued existence as a stable government.40 These commentators ar-
gue that, if the majority believes that a certain act is immoral, they
have a prima facie right to prohibit that behavior.4' These scholars
33. See W. O'DONNELL & D.JONES, THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND MARITAL ALTERNA-
TivEs 47 (1982).
34. Note, Developments in the Law--The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1157, 1285 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Developments in the Law] (noting that few differ-
ences exist between traditional and same-sex childrearing).
35. O'DONNELL, supra note 33, at 47.
36. Developments in the Law, supra note 34, at 1287. Supporters of Denmark's bill
legalizing homosexual marriages argued that implementation of the bill "may help
prevent the spread of [AIDS], encouraging more stable relationships between homo-
sexuals." Isherwood, Denmark Legalizes Homosexual Marriages, Proprietary to the
United Press International, May 26, 1989 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt file).
37. LeFrancois, The Constitution and the "Right" to Marty: A Jurisprudential Analysis, 5
OKLA. Crrv U.L. REV. 507, 552-55 (1980). Same-sex marriages advance important
social goals because (1) marital intimacy and stability are promoted, (2) population
growth is not a rational state interest, and (3) same-sex couples are equally as compe-
tent to raise children as are heterosexual couples. Id.
38. Note, Developments in the Law, supra note 34, at 1289.
39. See Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986, 989
(1966) [hereinafter Dworkin, Lord Devlin].
40. See Sartorious, The Enforcement of Morality, 81 YAt.E LJ. 891, 892, 892 n.6
(1972) (noting that professors Hart and Dworkin support this proposition). But see
infra notes (discussing that sexual orientation is not indicative of morality).
41. Id. at 893. Some argue that governmental interests are protected by uni-
formly denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples. These arguments are, for the
most part, variations of the morality argument. First, the government's approach
toward homosexuality should be one of treatment and rehabilitation rather than tol-
erance and legalization. Second, the government should seek to prevent an increase
1991]
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conclude that society may prohibit behavior that brings about signifi-
cant change in social institutions upon which society places a high
value.42
III. THE BENEFITS OF MARRIAGE
Same-sex couples are significantly disadvantaged because they are
unable to legitimize their relationships through marriage.43 They
are denied government benefits, for example, that accompany mar-
riage. Same-sex couples cannot file joint federal and state tax re-
turns, 4 4 and they are ineligible for gift and estate tax benefits, 45
Social Security Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance bene-
fits,46 and inheritance rights.47 Furthermore, courts frequently up-
in homosexuality among adolescents. Third, the issuance of marriage licenses to
same-sex couples is in direct conflict with state statutes outlawing homosexual acts.
Note, Legality, supra note 30, at 580-81.
Because the causes of homosexuality are in dispute, whether "treatment is nec-
essary, desirable, or successful and whether a same-sex marriage prohibition has any
bearing on adolescent sexual identity and development is still indeterminable." See
id. at 581 n.39, 582; see also Comment, Homosexuals' Right to Marry: A Constitutional Test
and a Legislative Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 193, 198 (1979) (hereinafter Comment,
Right to Marry]; Friedman, Necessity for State Recognition, supra note 25, at 156-57.
Legalizing same-sex marriages creates a potential conflict with existing state law.
However, many state statutes that criminalize homosexual conduct have been re-
pealed or are not routinely enforced. See Note, Legality, supra note 30, at 581-82, 82
n.42 (estimating there are 20 convictions for every six million arrests); Lewis, Moral
Discourse, supra note 25, at 1800 n.95 ("Twenty-five states have decriminalized homo-
sexual sodomy in the past fifteen years."). But-see Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney
for Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (uphold-
ing Virginia statute making sodomy a crime when applied to homosexual relations
between adult males); State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 11 (Minn. 1990) (upholding a
landlord's refusal to rent a house to an unmarried tenant who planned to live with a
member of the opposite sex).
42. Lord Devlin, supra note 39, at 989.
43. See Comment, Right to Marry, supra note 41, at 155 (discussing married
couples' eligibility for many entitlements, including special tax treatment, Social Se-
curity benefits, survivor's benefits upon death of a veteran spouse, benefits of intes-
tate succession, favorable immigration laws, property and support rights upon
divorce, and, often-times, special insurance benefits and lower insurance rates). L.
WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CoNTRAcT: SPOUSES, LOVERS AND THE LAW 367-69 (1981).
44. I.R.C. § 6013(a) (1990) provides that "[a] husband and wife may make a sin-
gle return jointly of income taxes under Subtitle A .... " See also Comment, Right to
Marry, supra note 41, at 198 n.32. (The Internal Revenue Service accepts the state's
definition of marriage because marital status is defined under state law.).
45. See I.R.C. § 2056 (1990); see also I.R.C. § 2523 (1990) which provides in part:
(a) Allowance of deduction.-Where a donor transfers during the calendar
year by gift an interest in property to a donee who at the time of the gift is
the donor's spouse, there shall be allowed as a deduction in computing taxa-
ble gifts for the calendar year an amount with respect to such interest equal
to its value.
Id.
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(a) (1983 & Supp. 1990) (defining spouse and surviving
[Vol. 17
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hold challenges by relatives when homosexual individuals attempt to
provide for their partners through wills.48
Same-sex couples are denied benefits that are granted to similarly
situated married heterosexual couples. For example, in Coon v. Jo-
seph,49 a male plaintiff sought recovery for emotional distress suf-
fered after witnessing the assault of an "intimate male friend."50
The court held that a "close relationship," which is necessary to jus-
tify imputing foreseeability of emotional distress to tortfeasors, did
not include the "significant, stable and exclusive" relationship plead
by plaintiff.51 The court stated that a sufficiently close relationship
to warrant recovery was that which existed between a parent and
child, a husband and wife, and between a woman and man who have
established a valid common law marriage in a state which allows such
marriages.52
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in McConnell v. Nooner,53 ad-
dressed the denial of increased Veterans benefits to a party involved
in a same-sex relationship.54 A male co-plaintiff petitioned the Vet-
eran's Administration for increased benefits on the grounds that the
other male co-plaintiff was a dependent spouse. 55 In light of the fed-
eral statute providing that the validity of marriage must be deter-
mined by the law of the jurisdiction where the parties were married,
spouse); Id. § 416(b) (defining wife); Id. § 416(c) (defining widow); Id. § 416(f)
(defining husband); Id. § 41 6 (g) (defining widower); see also id. §§ 416(h)(l)(A),
416(h)(1)(B) (determination of family status).
47. See section 525 of the Minnesota Statutes which provides in part:
When any person dies, testate or intestate, (1) The surviving spouse shall be
allowed from the personal property of which the decedent was possessed to
which the decedent was entitled at the time of death, the wearing apparel,
and, as selected, furniture and household goods not exceeding $6,000 in
value, and other personal property not exceeding $3,000 in value, subject to
an award of property with sentimental value to the decedent's children
under section 525.152 .... (3) If there be no surviving spouse, the minor
children shall receive the property specified in clause (1) as selected in their
behalf.
MINN. STAT. § 525.15 (1990).
48. See Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187,
192; Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. Prrr. L. REV. 225, 267
(1981) (Homosexuals are more likely to receive testamentary challenges than heter-
osexuals who bequeath portions of their estate to a lover or spouse.).
49. 192 Cal. App. 3d 1269, 237 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1987).
50. Id. at 1273, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
51. Id. at 1274, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
52. Id.
53. 547 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1976). Interestingly, the plaintiffs in this action are the
same as in Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 810 (1972). While the case was pending in the Minnesota Supreme Court,
Baker and McConnell were granted a marriage license from the Blue Earth County
Court Clerk. A minister then performed a marriage ceremony for them.
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the court held that same-sex marriages are prohibited under Minne-
sota law and thus the increased benefits were denied.56
Yet another example of discrimination in the disbursement of ben-
efits is demonstrated in Adams v. Howerton.57 A male United States
citizen and a male alien were "married" by a minister in Colorado.58
The court denied a petition for classification of the alien as an imme-
diate relative of the United States citizen. The court stated that a
homosexual marriage did not qualify the alien as the citizen's spouse
under Section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.59
Recently, there has been some movement by the courts in the di-
rection of granting benefits to same-sex couples. In July 1989, the
New York Court of Appeals, in Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co. ,60 ruled
that a homosexual couple that had lived together in a long-term rela-
tionship may be considered a family under the state's rent-control
regulations.61 The Braschi court held that a surviving partner of a
deceased tenant-of-record was entitled to maintain occupancy of the
apartment as the surviving spouse or family member of the de-
ceased.62 However, the courts generally have not been hospitable to
the claim that a long-term same-sex relationship is analogous to a
marriage.
IV. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
During the 1960s, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment 63 was used to attack legislation that had an adverse im-
pact on minority groups. "The clear and central purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of
invidious racial discrimination. -64 The fourteenth amendment has
been successfully used to attack discrimination based on color, na-
56. Id. (relying on Baker, 291 Minn. at 310, 191 N.W.2d at 185).
57. 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).
58. Id. at 1038.
59. Id.
60. 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
61. Id. at 214, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
62. Id.
63. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
64. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967). See Comment, Constitutional Aspects
of the Homosexual's Right to a Marriage License, 12J. FAM. L. 607, 610 (1967) [hereinafter
Comment, Constitutional Aspects] (using reasonable classification requires persons in
similar circumstances to be treated alike); United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
[Vol. 17
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 14
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss2/14
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
tionality, alienage and race. 6 5 Clearly, the fourteenth amendment is
a useful tool for vindicating individual rights.66
When a fundamental right or a suspect class is not involved, and if
a mere rational relationship to a legitimate state end exists, a statute
will pass constitutional muster.67 A law challenged under this ra-
tional basis standard is reviewed in light of four factors: (1) the law is
presumptively valid; (2) the law does not need to be "mathematically
precise, and some incidental inequities will be tolerated"; (3) judicial
review based on legislative purpose is not required if the law is "ra-
tional"; and (4) the challenger must prove the statute unreasona-
ble.68 In other words, the Court will invalidate a law " 'only if no
grounds can be conceived of to justify [the law].' "69 In addition, the
courts afford state legislatures broad discretion.70 Thus, the rational
basis standard acts as a rubber stamp7 ' because the challenged law is
virtually always upheld.72
A. Heightened Scrutiny
Despite the difficulty of invoking fourteenth amendment protec-
tion, same-sex unions may qualify for constitutional protection be-
cause marriage is considered a fundamental right. The key question
arising under the fundamental rights analysis is whether marriage as
a fundamental right encompasses both heterosexual and same-sex
unions. Same-sex marriage as fundamental right would trigger a
strict scrutiny standard of judicial review for statutes affecting same-
sex unions.
304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (Equal protection clause protects "discrete and insular
minorities" from prejudice or indifference by the majority.).
65. Chaitin & Lefcourt, Is Gay Suspect?, 8 LINCOLN L. REV. 24, 35 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter Chaitin & Lefcourt, Suspect].
66. Comment, Homosexuals' Right to Many, supra note 41, at 610.
67. Id. at 35-36.
68. Note, Marital Status Classifications: Protecting Homosexual and Heterosexual
Cohabitors, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 111, 118 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Marital
Status].
69. Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Clas-
sifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 808 (1984) [hereinafter Note,
Application] (quoting McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969)).
70. Ohio Bureau of Employment v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 491-92 (1977)
(Supreme Court will not impose its views as to the wisdom of a state statute so long
as the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.)
71. Note, Application, supra note 69, at 808. See Simon, Racially Prejudiced Govern-
mental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination,
15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1113 (1978) (charging traditional rational basis test as
nothing more than a "sham as an independent standard of constitutional review
. ...").
72. But see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrITiONAL LAW 994-96 (1988) (Courts held
some early 1970 statutes invalid even while applying a rationality standard.).
1991]
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Suspect class status for same-sex unions will also trigger height-
ened scrutiny judicial review. However, the central issue under the
suspect class analysis is whether same-sex couples as a group fall
within the definition of a suspect class.
1. Marriage as a Fundamental Right
Fundamental rights are "those rights which have their source, and
are explicitly or implicitly guaranteed, in the federal constitution
.... "73 The Supreme Court generally sustains classifications regard-
ing economic or social welfare legislation if the action is within the
realm of legitimate governmental functions.74 Conversely, where
civil liberties and rights are at issue, the Court will evaluate whether
the classification is constitutionally permissible pursuant to the equal
protection guarantee. 75
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "free-
dom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one
of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment."76 "There can be no prohibition of marriage
except for an important social objective and by reasonable means." 77
Furthermore, a state statute impinging on the freedom of intimate
association, which includes marriage, requires an important and le-
gitimate justification to withstand constitutional challenge.
The first amendment also safeguards the freedom of association as
it relates to marriage. In Griswold v. Connecticut,78 a Connecticut stat-
ute making it a crime to use a contraceptive device was struck down
because it invaded "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." 79 The
law was found unconstitutional because it sought "to achieve its
goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that
relationship. "80
73. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 674 (6th ed. 1990).
74. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTrTmONAL LAW 384 (1978).
75. Id.
76. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); see also Lov-
ing v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942).
However, much depends on how the issue is framed. The Supreme Court, in
Bowers v. Hardwick, stated that "[t]he constitution does not confer a fundamental right
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187
(1986).
77. Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal.2d 711, 713, 198 P.2d 17, 18-19 (1948). In Perez, the
court stated that "marriage is .. .something more than a civil contract subject to
regulation by the state, it is a fundamental right of free men." Id.
78. 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) (Freedom of association is a peripheral first
amendment right, without which "those specific rights would be less secure.").
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2. Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification
Statutes affecting suspect groups are entitled to a heightened or
strict scrutiny standard of judicial review.81 Under a strict scrutiny
standard, the state carries a heavy burden of proof and must estab-
lish that the statute is necessary to promote a compelling state inter-
est.82 Given the state's heavy burden, strict scrutiny essentially
presumes the challenged statute is unconstitutional and therefore in-
valid if the classification is based on a suspect class, such as race,
national origin or alienage.83
A classification consists of individuals who share common charac-
teristics. To be deemed a suspect classification, the common charac-
teristics must be "essential elements of personhood" and must be
the basis of discrimination.84 Personhood is comprised of three sep-
arate components: -[I]t must be essential to individual identity, es-
sential to group identity, and essential to society's perception of
those identities."85 A certain group, for instance, may share irrele-
vant characteristics such as eye or hair color, but not qualify for sus-
pect classification.
The Supreme Court has granted suspect status to classes based on
race,8 6 alienage,87 and ancestry.8 8 In addition, poverty has also been
seen as suspect, 89 and the Supreme Court has not barred additions
to the list of suspect status qualifiers.90 Judicial designation of ho-
mosexuality as a suspect class could provide a comprehensive doctri-
81. Sullivan, Same Sex Marages, supra note 17, at 283.
82. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1966) (holding that statute preventing
marriages solely on the basis of racial classification violates the equal protection and
due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment).
83. Note, Application, supra note 69, at 810.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1300.
Individuals within the group must themselves view the trait as important to
their individual identities; the group defined by the trait must have some
sort of internal sense of group identity; and society must treat the individual
group members differently for having that characteristic-their social expe-
rience must be to some degree defined by the trait.
Id.
86. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (striking down statute preventing
men and women of color from cohabitation with Caucasian members of the opposite
sex).
87. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 413 (1948) (finding that
statute disfavoring resident alien Japanese affected suspect classification).
88. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Classification disfavors
persons of Japanese ancestry.).
89. Note, Legality, supra note 30, at 576, 576 n.9. While not totally beyond a
party's control, wealth may still represent a status not freely chosen or not easily
discarded.
90. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-25 (1973) (dis-
cussing wealth as a basis for possible suspect classification).
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nal framework for addressing some of the problems of inequality.91
If homosexuality is a suspect classification, the state bears a heavy
burden if a statute is challenged. The state must show both that the
classification is necessary to accomplish a legitimate state interest
and that the law promotes a compelling state interest.92
The Supreme Court has not established explicit grounds for sus-
pect classification.9g However, certain common elements seem to
exist, including immutability, derogatory stereotyping, history of dis-
crimination and political disadvantage.
a. Immutability
Classifications based on immutable traits are sometimes consid-
ered suspect. 94 An immutable trait is one "not capable or suscepti-
ble to change: unchangeable, unchanging, invariable, unalterable."95
Race, for example, is an immutable trait.
Because individuals should not be penalized for something beyond
their control, it is not fair to base legal burdens or the receipt of
benefits on an immutable characteristic. Concerned with this aspect
of fairness, the Supreme Court, in Plyler v. Doe,96 stated that "legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility
or wrongdoing."9 7
The origins and mutability of one's sexual orientation are un-
clear.98 What is clear is that homosexuality is a status and not merely
91. Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1297 (1985) (arguing that declaration of homo-
sexuality as a suspect class will "bridge the gap in the protection of gay rights be-
tween privacy doctrine and the first amendment"). But see Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding military directive created by act of Congress,
even though it specifically discriminated against Japanese).
92. Chaitin & Lefcourt, Suspect, supra note 65, at 36. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1966) (Racial classification triggered strict scrutiny.); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (Supreme Court held Florida law invalid because it
criminalized unmarried cohabitation only if the parties were of different skin color.);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1960) (Statute requiring residency for more
than one year to qualify for welfare benefits creates suspect class and is void.). But see
Buchanan, Linchpin, supra note 22, at 549-72 (discussing a series of secular arguments
which support the government's nonrecognition of same-sex marriage as a means
narrowly drawn to support a compelling state interest in "protecting and fostering
the marriage institution," and thus withstanding even strict scrutiny).
93. Comment, Constitutional Aspects, supra note 64, at 618.
94. Id. at 612.
95. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1131 (1971).
96. 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down denial of public education to children of
illegal aliens).
97. Id. at 220 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175
(1972)).
98. Researchers tend to agree on some theories. Sexual orientation usually de-
velops by age five or six, with conservative estimates having sexual orientation firmly
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a chosen activity. A person's homosexual orientation exists regard-
less of whether that person has ever engaged in a homosexual act.99
Generally, sexual orientation is thought to be impervious to
change too While sexual behavior may be susceptible to suppres-
sion, conversion of a person's sexual orientation is not strongly sub-
stantiated.101 Sexual orientation, therefore, is distinguishable from
sexual activity. 102
Immutability can be further broken down into characteristics
which are visible and invisible. Assuming that homosexuality is an
unalterable characteristic, it follows that homosexuality can be analo-
gized to other unalterable characteristics, such as race.t03 "[S]exual
preference, like skin pigmentation, cannot be changed and, like race,
homosexuality is immutable.'104 Racial groups, however, are also
established by adolescence. Note, Application, supra note 69, at 818. General discus-
sions and theories regarding sexual orientation are available in numerous sources.
See, e.g., J. MONEY & A. EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN, Boy & GIRL 228 (1972); M.
SAGHIR & E. ROBINS, MALE & FEMALE HOMOSEXUALrrY 319 (1973); R. KRONEMEYER,
OVERCOMING HOMOSEXUALrrY 195 (1980).
Further, research suggests that neither individuals themselves, nor their parents
control sexual orientation. Lewis, Moral Discourse, supra note 25, at 1799 ("The over-
whelming psychiatric evidence demonstrates, however, that homosexuality is not a
matter of simple election but rather a deep-seated psycho-social phenomenon estab-
lished in early childhood years.").
Several factors such as physiological, biological, hormonal, social or psychologi-
cal variables, or "multiple interacting with different variances in different individu-
als" may lead to the development of a particular sexual orientation which an
individual cannot control. Note, Application, supra note 69, at 819. See also Comment,
Assessing Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody
Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852, 859 n.35, 859 n.36 (1985) ("Under its current diag-
nostic system, the American Psychiatric Association does not consider homosexuality
a form of mental disease.").
99. See G. WEINBERG, SOCIErY AND THE HEALTHY HOMOSEXUAL 70 (1972) (An in-
dividual, although abstaining from homosexual conduct, may still be a homosexual;
conversely, a person may participate in homosexual activity despite heterosexual
orientation.).
100. Chaitin & Lefcourt, Suspect, supra note 65, at 39-40. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F.
Supp. 1121, 1129 (N.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984),
rev'd on rehk'g, 769 F.2d 289 (1985) (evidence exists indicating that sexual orientation
would be difficult and painful, if not impossible, to reverse by psychiatric treatment);
see also DJ. WEST, HOMOSEXUALrrY RE-EXAMINED 266 (1977).
101. See generally C. TRIPP, THE HOMOSEXUAL MATRIX 236-41 (1975).
Some psychoanalysts believe therapists merely assist a homosexual in adjusting
to his or her sexual orientation. Others claim that after a lengthy and costly process,
combined with a strong desire to change, heterosexuality may be achieved. Note,
Application, supra note 69, at 817.
But see Comment, Right to Many, supra note 41, at 206 (Although a close call,
sexual preference cannot be viewed as immutable.).
102. Id.
103. Chaitin & Lefcourt, Suspect, supra note 65, at 39-40.
104. Id. at 40.
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"visibly identifiable."105 Visibility, of course, brings to mind physical
characteristics or features, features which identify members as be-
longing to a particular group.' 06
Because the visible or physical characteristics present in race clas-
sifications are not readily apparent in homosexuals, the analogy be-
tween race and homosexuality is weakened. However, persons of
ethnic heritage are automatically entitled to the strict scrutiny stan-
dard on grounds of immutability, irrespective of visibility.'07
Arguably, the same reasoning applies to homosexuals.108 Because
suspect class protection has been extended to classes based on traits
which are not necessarily visible, homosexuality might also qualify
for suspect class protection.10 9 However, immutability is not neces-
sarily required, nor always sufficient to create suspect class status." 1 0
b. Derogatory Stereotyping
A second factor considered in granting suspect class protection is
whether the group has been the subject of "hostile myths or deroga-
tory stereotypes which have the result of instilling fear or enmity to-
ward such groups in the popular mind."' Classes subject to hostile
or derogatory stereotyping are usually granted suspect status
protection. 112
Hostility toward homosexuality is pervasive in western society and
dates far back into history.' 1S In fact, stereotypes are abundant. De-
rogatory stereotypes include such things as that homosexuals are in-
clined toward pedophilia,114 or that homosexuals recruit others,
particularly young people, to adopt a homosexual lifestyle.' 15 Less
hostile stereotypes include the idea that homosexuals predominate
in certain professions or that homosexual men are effeminate and
lesbians are masculine.116 Since homosexuals are subject to such
105. Id.




110. Note, Application, supra note 69, at 813. See also Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE LJ. 1063, 1073 n.51 (1980).
111. Comment, Constitutional Aspects, supra note 64, at 613.
112. Note, Legality, supra note 30, at 576-77.
113. Id. at 577.
114. Comment, Constitutional Aspects, supra note 64, at 615. See alsoJ. GAGNON & W.
SIMON, SEXUAL ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN ADULTS AND CHILDREN 11 (1970); M. SCHO-
FIELD, SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 149 (1965) (Pedophiles are gener-
ally considered a group distinct from either homosexuals or heterosexuals.).
115. Note, Application, supra note 69, at 822-23, 823 nn.151-54.
116. Note, Legality, supra note 30, at 577 n.14.
[Vol. 17
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 14
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss2/14
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
disparaging stereotypes and misconceptions, another element of sus-
pect classification is met.
c. Historical Discrimination
A third element, a history of public or private discrimination, is
also a characteristic of groups granted suspect status.1 17 "A past his-
tory of unjustified unequal treatment seems in itself a strong argu-
ment for the court to apply strict scrutiny to legislation adversely
affecting such a group."t18 However, historical discrimination
against a particular class is not alone sufficient to trigger a strict scru-
tiny standard of review.' 19 For example, those who commit crimes
have been subjected to a "history of purposeful unequal treatment"
because society believes such treatment is justified.120 Still, the "his-
tory of discrimination" factor is emphasized by the Court when de-
termining whether to grant suspect class protection.121
A cultural theme of aversion to homosexuals dates back to biblical
times.' 22 Relying on biblical authority, the Talmudic codes elabo-
rated on the laws against sodomy.' 23 By the end of the Middle Ages,
homosexuality was "identified with heresy and often punishable by
death." 124
More recently, discrimination has appeared in the form of
homophobia.125 Discrimination has at times even reached "hysteri-
cal proportions."' 126 Although not as harsh, contemporary society
continues to maintain a hostile attitude toward homosexuality.127
Continued discrimination and prejudice suffered by homosexuals
provides support for the use of suspect classification for
homosexuals. 128
117. ld. at 577.
118. Comment, Constitutional Aspects, supra note 64, at 614.
119. Note, Application, supra note 69, at 814.
120. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 250 n.64 (1980) (For example, the law dis-
advantages extortionists with good cause.).
121. Chaitin & Lefcourt, Suspect, supra note 65, at 41.
122. See Leviticus 20:13 ("If a man lies with a man as one lies with a woman, both of
them have done what is detestable. They must be put to death .... ").
123. See Comment, Constitutional Aspects, supra note 64, at 617, 617 n.39.
124. Id. at 618.
125. See Note, Application, supra note 69, at 824 and n.171. ("Homophobia refers,
in general, to negative attitudes toward homosexuals or homosexuality based either
entirely on prejudice or on experience which is strongly colored by prejudice.").
126. Id. at 825, 825 n.173 (For example, during the Anita Bryant crusade to re-
verse a gay rights ordinance in Florida, "Kill a Queer for Christ" bumper stickers
were common.).
127. Comment, Constitutional Aspects, supra note 64, at 618.
128. See, e.g., Note, Dismissal of Homosexuals from Government Employment: The Develop-
ing Role of Due Process in Administrative Adjudications, 58 GEO. L.J. 632 (1970). NASA
dismissed plaintiff for making homosexual advances because it rendered him "unfit
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d. Exclusion from the Political Process
Groups that receive suspect classification usually have "little or no
voice in the political process."t 2 9 These groups have been "ex-
cluded systematically from the political arena" and "[tiheir interests
have not been protected by the legislative process."30
"[H]omosexuals as such are without effective political power."'S'
The desire of homosexuals to avoid prejudice may lead some to
adopt a heterosexual lifestyle, limiting their ability to participate in
political activities on behalf of the homosexual community.132 Also,
many homosexuals are simply "unwilling to work for, advocate, or
even be counted in favor of progay legislation."133 In reality, this
may be a "defensive reaction to the moral opprobrium and discrimi-
nation society inflicts upon gays."' 3 4
Furthermore, homosexual participation in the political arena may
be ineffective because others may refuse to bargain with them.'35
Some legislators, who must answer to those who elected them, may
fear their votes will be interpreted as condoning immoral behavior
and, thus, become a political liability.136
The movement by the homosexual community toward full rights
and public acceptance continues to gain strength, and "its increasing
momentum will likely mobilize the homosexual vote."' 3 7 More
homosexuals are openly being elected to public office.138 Despite
progress, however, homosexuals as a group are still politically disad-
vantaged and are far from being adequately protected in the political
arena. 13 9
In light of the fact that homosexuality exhibits the factors com-
monly associated with suspect status, strict scrutiny should be ap-
plied to laws affecting homosexuals.
for further government employment." Id. at 633. See also Note, Administrative Law-
Constitutional Law--Is Governmental Policy Affecting the Employment of Homosexuals Ra-
tional?, 48 N.C.L. REV. 912 (1970); Note, Government-Created Employment Disabilities of
the Homosexual, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1738 (1969).
129. Comment, Constitutional Aspects, supra note 64, at 614.
130. Chaitin & Lefcourt, Suspect, supra note 65, at 41.
131. Comment, Constitutional Aspects, supra note 64, at 616.
132. Note, Application, supra note 69, at 826.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 732 (1985).
136. See Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns of Behavior: Sanctions on Non-marital Co-
habitation, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 275, 299 (exploring the legal system's adjustment to the
changing behavior patterns of cohabitation between married persons).
137. Comment, Right to Marry, supra note 41, at 204.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 204-05.
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3. Normative Justifications for Strict Scrutiny
Ways other than those outlined above exist for a group to obtain
suspect class status.140 The Court, in Plyler v. Doe,14' stated that
"[s]everal formulations might explain our treatment of certain classi-
fications as 'suspect.' "142 Three different normative approaches
may justify suspect class status and a strict scrutiny standard ofjudi-
cial review for homosexuals.143
a. Process Justification
The process justification approach uses the strict scrutiny standard
of review as a way to correct imbalances of power and abuse in the
political system.' 44 According to this theory, the courts and legisla-
tures have a duty to "protect those who can't protect themselves
politically." 145
Legislatures have a duty to refrain from premising legislation on
prejudice, stereotypes or caprice. 146 Elected officials also owe a duty
to accord the entirety of their constituency equal concern and re-
spect.' 4 7 When the government and governmental officials fail to
meet these objectives, the judiciary is called upon to guard against
"degradation or the imposition of stigma."148 Judicial review serves
to protect rights of minority groups from harms imposed by the ma-
jority.149 The judiciary's purpose is to see that society treats each
person "as a respected, responsible, and participating member."150
The government should not discriminate on the basis of any factor
that is not indicative of a "person's moral status."'15 Moral status
encompasses one's "activities, talents, skills and needs" but not
one's sexual orientation.152
A decision as to moral irrelevance is essentially a balancing of the
correlation between the trait and proper governmental goals on
the one hand, and the negative effects from using a particular clas-
140. See id. at 828; see also Note, Marital Status, supra note 68, at 128-29, 129 n. 118.
141. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
142. Id. at 216 n.14.
143. Note, Application, supra note 69, at 828.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 152.
146. Id. at 137.
147. Id. at 73.
148. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term, Forward: Equal Citizenship Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1977).
149. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 160-62 (1980).
150, Id. at 4, 26.
151. Perry, The Principle of Equal Protection, 32 HASTINGS LJ. 1133, 1138-39 (1981)





Wilson: Same-sex Marriage: A Review
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1991
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
sification on the other. A correlation... almost always exists be-
tween a classifying trait and a governmental end sought. Any
correlation that exists between homosexuality and a legitimate gov-
ernmental goal most likely will not outweigh the costs of using that
classification. ' 53
Sexual orientation is simply not relevant to governmental decisions
with respect to distributing benefits and imposing burdens on
individuals. 154
Judicial applications of process theories are available to politically
powerless minorities when a group is the subject of "incorrect ste-
reotypes."' 55 The strict scrutiny standard of review applies to laws
that disadvantage a politically helpless minority that has been sub-
jected to prejudice.'5 6
The standard of review for classes subjected to stereotyping differs
according to the class. One theory calls for strict scrutiny only if the
"class suffers from stigmatizing stereotypes that serve to perpetuate
a caste system."' 57 A second theory provides that strict scrutiny is
allowed only if incorrect stereotypes accompany political powerless-
ness.' 5 8 This second theory also adds that legislators should not be
members of the class in question.159 Since homosexuals have been
subject to first degree prejudice and forms of stereotyping, the gen-
eral consensus is that homosexuals meet suspect class status and are
entitled to the strict scrutiny standard of review.160
b. Instrumental Rationality
The instrumental rationality theory focuses on the "means chosen
to implement legislative ends" to justify a strict scrutiny standard of
review. 16' The question is whether the challenged means of the leg-
islation is rationally related to the end sought.162 The instrumental
rationality theory is concerned with improper legislative motives
rather than with improper goals.163 For example, if the classification
is more likely than not irrational, the strict scrutiny standard of re-
view is used.' 6 4 The rationality theory further proposes that courts
153. Note, Application, supra note 69, at 831.
154. Id. at 830.
155. Id. at 831.
156. Id. (citing Karst, supra note 148, at 63.).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 831-32 (discussing "we-they" stereotyping).
159. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 159 (1980).
160. Note, Application, supra note 69, at 828-32.
161. Id. at 832.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 833.
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invalidate as irrational any law if the benefits due to invalidation
outweigh the costs of "instability, relitigation, and lack of
uniformity."165
With respect to homosexual classifications, the instrumental ra-
tionality theory justifies the use of strict scrutiny "to the extent that
classifications are more likely than not based on erroneous premises
or are marginally inefficient."166
c. Public Values Theory
The public values theory uses strict scrutiny as a way to ensure that
laws implement only public values. 167 This theory views the function
of the equal protection clause as "prohibit[ing] unprincipled distri-
butions of resources and opportunities. Distributions are unprinci-
pled when they are not an effort to serve a public value, but reflect
the view that it is intrinsically desirable to treat one person better
than another."168 Undoubtedly, distributions that discriminate
against homosexuals can be considered unprincipled and therefore
unconstitutionally motivated, thus triggering strict scrutiny.
B. Heightened Rationality
Even if homosexuals are not granted suspect status and the benefit
of strict scrutiny judicial review, an "intermediate" level of scrutiny
provides an alternative.169 The "heightened rationality" 17o test may
provide an alternative standard of review for legislative classifica-
tions based on sexual preference. The heightened rationality stan-
dard is a "more modest interventionism"171 and has been applied in
place of the lower standard of rationality.172 Legislation is reviewed
165. Note, Application, supra note 69, at 833; see also Bice, supra note 164, at 36;
Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory,
67 CAUF. L. REV. 1049 (1979) (exploring theory and practice of the rationality
requirement).
166. Note, Application, supra note 69, at 833. According to the commentator, "the
instrumental rationality theories require courts to accept the government's goals as a
given premise." Essentially then, purposeful discrimination is permitted under a ra-
tionality theory if the purpose is declared legitimate or beyond the power of the gov-
ernment. Id. at 833 n.225.
167. Id. at 834.
168. Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 Sup.
CT. REV. 127, 128.
169. Comment, Right to Marry, supra note 41, at 207.
170. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (recognizing that classification must
be reasonable and not arbitrary).
171. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Termn-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1972)
(analyzing the Supreme Court's decisions with respect to equal protection
developments).
172. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972) (requiring that classifi-
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with a type of "graduated, sliding-scale test."' 73
Chief Justice Burger, in Reed v. Reed,t74 recognized that while
states could justify treating classes of persons in different ways, the
classifications must not be unreasonable or arbitrary.175 The classifi-
cation " 'must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation ....' "176 This
test is more flexible than the rigid two-tiered rationality/strict scru-
tiny approach. 177
The intermediate test, as described by the court in Boraas v. Village
of Belle Terre,'78 considers three factors. In deciding whether the clas-
sification is substantially related to the object of the statute, the court
examines the "nature of the unequal classification under attack, the
nature of the rights adversely affected, and the governmental interest
urged in support of it."179
This intermediate standard protects rights that may not be classi-
fied as fundamental. It also seeks to protect individuals who are sub-
ject to discrimination, even though they are not classified as
suspect. 18 0 Intermediate rationality review is appropriate for classes
which come close to meeting the traditional indicia of
suspectness. 181
The middle-level test has been generally applied in cases dealing
with gender and illegitimacy.182 Homosexuals are also in need of
the "judicial protection offered by the 'heightened rationality'
test."' 83
With respect to same-sex marriages, if a balancing test under the
intermediate approach is used, the state has the burden of showing
that its restriction bears a substantial relationship to an important
cations be tailored to a specific purpose); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627
(1969) (holding that a statute denying benefits to residents living in a state less than a
year violates the equal protection clause).
173. City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 931 (2d Cir. 1973) (recogniz-
ing that the Supreme Court's two-tiered approach has been giving way to "a more
graduated, sliding-scale test").
174. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
175. Id. at 76.
176. Id. (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
177. Note, Kahn v. Shevin and the "Heightened Rationality Test": Is the Supreme Court
Promoting a Double Standard in Sex Discrimination Cases?, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 275,
277-78 (1975) (discussing discriminatory legislation under the equal protection
clause).
178. 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
179. Id. at 814.
180. Comment, Right to Many, supra note 41, at 207.
181. Id. at 209.
182. Id. at 208.
183. Id. at 209.
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governmental objective.184 The state may take into consideration
"matters of legitimate concern" to the state.1 85 "Such legislation,
however, must [not] be based . . . on arbitrary classifications of
groups ... *"186 If the state's action is "merely a cloak for prejudice
and intolerance"187 and there is no valid purpose behind the action,
the court may not uphold the legislation, especially if the state action
is detrimental to a specific class.188
States' prohibition of same-sex marriages does not advance any
legitimate state interest. States have attempted to justify the same-
sex marriage prohibition on several grounds, including: (1) prevent-
ing an increase in homosexuality; (2) supporting state sodomy laws;
and (3) promoting family stability, as well as procreation.189 How-
ever, "[flor each of these objectives, either the state interest itself is
not legitimate or the relationship between that interest and prohibi-
tion of homosexual marriage is too attenuated to validate the classifi-
cation."190 Thus, under a heightened rationality analysis, laws
prohibiting same-sex marriages would be struck down and same-sex
couples would be able to marry, if they so desire.
CONCLUSION
In a November 1989 poll published by Time magazine, '91 individu-
als were asked whether marriage between homosexual couples
should be recognized by law. Sixty-nine percent of those polled said
no. 192 Seventy-five percent of those polled felt that homosexual
couples should not be legally permitted to adopt children.193
Public reaction to the grant of benefits to homosexuals received
more favorable results. In the Time magazine poll, sixty-five percent
thought homosexual couples should be allowed to inherit each
other's property and fifty-four percent agreed that homosexual
couples should be permitted to receive medical insurance and life
insurance benefits from a partner's policies.94
While still facing much adversity, same-sex couples are making
184. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
185. Ingram, Critique, supra note 24, at 44.
186. Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal.2d 711, 718, 198 P.2d 17, 21 (Cal. 1948).
187. See Ingram, Critique, supra note 24, at 44.
188. Id.
189. Comment, Right to Marty, supra note 41, at 210; see generally Weitzman, Legal
Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1169, 1243 (1974) (ana-
lyzing current marriage contracts and suggesting an alternative form for the legal
structure of personal relations).
190. Comment, Right to Marty, supra note 41, at 210.
191. Isaacson, Should Gays Have Marriage Rights?, TIME, Nov. 20, 1989, at 101.
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headway in today's society. Whether same-sex couples will be
granted marriage licenses in the future is questionable. Neverthe-
less, as evidenced by both the Time magazine poll and the recent
movement by municipalities to grant registered partnership status to
same-sex couples, equal access to benefits for same-sex couples may
be an achievable goal.
Registered partnerships, however, do not confer all of the benefits
that flow from state sanctioned marriage. Legislative enactments
conferring full state recognition on same-sex relationships do not
seem imminent. The courts, armed with the strict scrutiny standard
of review or an intermediate standard of review, have the opportu-
nity to aid in the advancement of the important societal goal of elimi-
nating prejudice and discrimination for all people. Until and unless
change comes from the state legislature, or from the state or federal
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